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"We have to fight and destroy them . . .  The Christians massacred us 
six months ago. It's time to take back our land."1
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Introduction: The Recent Context of Violence in Indonesia
The words in the epigraph cited above were attributed to a commander of a 
Muslim militia, based in Temate, anticipating renewed operations in Halmahera in 
North Maluku, where over five hundred Muslims had been slaughtered in three days by 
local Christians of Tobelo subdistrict intent on reclaiming land they regarded as their 
own. That region has been but one of the sites where violent conflict between 
Christians and Muslims has erupted since the beginning of 1999. Similar utterances 
have been recorded from leaders, Muslim and Christian, in Ambon and its surrounding 
islands in Maluku, as well as around Poso in Central Sulawesi. They certainly reveal a 
religious framing of these conflicts, but they also indicate another aspect of these 
conflicts—the struggle over such resources as land. Popular media have sometimes 
portrayed these conflicts as instances of religious and sectarian strife, Muslims and 
Christians engaging in Holy War. The very title of the recent National Geographic 
treatment of this situation begins with the phrase "religious zealots," and the article 
opens with the words of Christian refugees in a camp in Bitung, North Sulawesi, that 
present a mirror image of the Muslim sense of victimization in the quotation above:
"The Muslims burned our houses!" said a retired army sergeant. "They destroyed 
our churches!" the village English teacher chimed in. "We were massacred."2
Yet, after emphasizing the religious dimension throughout its survey of conflict in 
Maluku, Aceh, and West Kalimantan, even this article admits the relevance of 
competition among groups for scarce resources: " . . .  but basically it was the old, 
complicated story of Indonesia: too many fighting for too little." 3 *
Such admissions also bring to the fore the question of how best to characterize the 
groups that have been fighting with each other over these resources. Clearly, most 
reports have privileged religious attributions: Christian and Muslim. However, in many 
areas, these two categories tend to overlap with the categories of "indigene" and 
"settler," where the latter category includes spontaneous migrants and their 
descendants, as well as those brought to the area, often more recently, under such 
government-sponsored programs as transmigrasi and resetelmen.A Clearly, hostilities in 
West Kalimantan5 and Central Kalimantan6 have not been primarily religious in origin, 
especially since Muslim Malays have tended to align themselves with the 
predominantly Christian Dayak against the Muslim Madurese. As analyzed by Syarif 
Ibrahim Alqadrie, a sociologist at Tanjungpura University in West Kalimantan:'
According to me, the conflict has been caused more by competition in the social- 
economic field between local inhabitants—both Dayaks and Malays—and the 
migrants from outside West Kalimantan, especially in the agricultural, plantation, 
forestry, mining, and informal sectors. Such competition is generally won by the
2 Tracy Dahlby, "Indonesia, Religious zealots and regional separatists force the issue: Can this far-flung 
nation hold together?," National Geographic 199,3 (2001): 80.
3 Dahlby, "Indonesia," p. 101.
 ^All italicized foreign terms are in Bahasa Indonesia, unless otherwise noted in following square brackets 
(e.g. [D] stands for Dutch, [L] for Latin, and [T] for Tado, the language of the "indigenous" Lindu people).
5 H. Y. W. Sudarsono et al., "Ketika Kerusuhan Mengguncang Bumi Khatulistiwa," Forum Keadilan 24,5 
(1997): 12-16.
6 Anonymous, "The wild men of Borneo practise ancestral ways," West Australian, March 3, 2001.
Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony 83
migrants. The issue is that they really do have more expertise, capital, and 
connections that reek of nepotism.7
Journalists have noted how companies with forest concession have tended to favor 
hiring outsiders, while local people have also tended to lose more political offices.8
Similar observations have been made in regard to the bloodshed in Ambon. The 
Human Rights Watch report Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon9 notes that the 
relationship between Christian and Muslim Ambonese had long been deteriorating, 
with the long lauded pela alliance system no longer functioning to sustain harmony 
between them. Whether or not provocateurs were involved there in the wake of the 
Ketapang incident in Jakarta,10 "tension between the two communities, Ambonese 
Christians, on the one hand, and Ambonese Muslims and Muslims from various 
migrant groups, on the other, was so high that it would have taken very little 
provocation to ignite an explosion."11 Yet, the report emphasizes a few pages later the 
importance of the "influx of migrants," especially the ethnic Butonese, Bugis, and 
Makassarese12 migrants from Southeast and South Sulawesi, who have settled in their 
own separate kampungs and come to "dominate small-scale retail trading and 
transportation networks."13 Not only are these Muslim migrants outside the traditional 
pela alliance system, but the dismantling of the traditional political system, based on 
clanship and territorial leaders called raja, by the imposition of a national system of 
uniform village governance has also opened up the political system to their rising 
influence. Backed by their current dominance in the transportation and small trading 
sectors, the Bugis, especially, have flexed their political muscle, "with tightly organized 
Bugis associations that local politicians ignored at their peril."14 While Christians' 
growing resentment of these economic and political competitors in Ambon was also 
linked to their perception of a general "greening" or Islamization of central government 
policy, their animosity did seem increasingly focused on the usurpations of the 
migrants:
As Christians were eased out of the positions they had traditionally held in the 
local government, the teaching profession, and police, they turned to the private
7 Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, "Pertikaian Antarsuku," Forum Keadilan 24,5 (1997): 20.
8 Sudarsono et al., "Ketika Kerusuhan Mengguncang Bumi Khatulistiwa," p. 16.
9 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon (Human Rights Watch Reports, vol. 11, no. 1 [C]) 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
10 Kennneth Young, "Migration, Provocateurs and Intercommunal Conflict: Ambon and Kalimantan," 
Seminar given in the School of Social Sciences, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia, 
September 1999; Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, pp. 7-9.
11 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, p. 2.
12 This combination of migrants from South Sulawesi has been so commonly considered a factor in contexts 
of ethnic conflict that they are now often referred to by the term BBM. See Greg Acciaioli, "Principles and 
Strategies of Bugis Migration: Some Contextual Factors Relating to Ethnic Conflict," Masyarakat Indonesia 
25,2 (1999): 240, 259.
13 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, p. 5.
14 Ibid.
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sector, only to find that migrant groups from Sulawesi, among others, had sewn 
up the market.15
Other observers have also opined that the conditions leading to the outbreak of the 
violence in Ambon and elsewhere in Maluku mainly concermed the way in which 
migrants, especially those from Sulawesi, had altered the balance of the local political 
economy, although subsequent polarization of opposing sides tended to develop along 
religious lines:
The social observer, Tamrin Amal Tomagola, has paid close attention to the roots 
of the conflict taking the form of economic and political injustice. "Its axis is the 
ethnic Bugis and Ambonese. Now it is spreading to religion."16
Even the head of the regional police who was replaced for failing to contain the 
violence in Ambon highlighted the "load of ethnic interests" mixed with "economic 
problems from the field of work,"17 while recognizing the religious dimension in the 
escalation of the conflict as well. Indeed, it is interesting to note the large proportion of 
specifically migrant targets, including "pedicabs (becak) owned largely by Butonese and 
Bugis," houses of "Buton, Bugis, Minang Sumatra, and Javanese, i.e. the migrants" in 
Kampung Paradeys,18 and "kiosks belonging to Bugis" in Batu Gantung,19 subjected to 
(counter-)attacks by Christian mobs in the early days after the original confrontation 
between a Christian Ambonese public transport driver and a Bugis youth (in some 
versions, the vehicle's conductor) in a transport terminal. Indeed, at a meeting of 
religious leaders held in mid-December 1998, even before the onset of intensified 
violence a month later, "the Muslims left convinced that the Christians had decided 
that the only way to address the problem was to rid the province of Muslim 
migrants."20 Such accounts indicate that while the violence in Ambon certainly became 
channeled along a Christian-Muslim axis, in origin it had at least as much to do with 
tensions developing from an indigene-settler opposition concerning control of 
resources, such as economic niches and political offices.21
15 Ibid.
16 Sapto Waluyo et al., "Nusa Apono Berwajah Sarajevo," Gamma (March 14,1999), p. 28.
17 Quoted in Acciaioli, "Principles and Strategies of Bugis Migration," p. 241.
18 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, p. 13.
19 Ibid., p. 14.
20 Ibid., p. 6.
21A similar argument may be made for settings of violence in North Maluku as well. The burning of migrant 
Makian houses in the village of Malifut by indigenous farmers in Kao, a district on the east coast of 
Halmahera, can be seen as a a response to intense competition between the two ethnic groups for jobs as 
laborers at a gold mine in Malifut. While the Makian are Muslim and the indigenous Kao are Christian, the 
territorial struggle between them seems to have more to do with the latter's resentment of the success of the 
former after they were transmigrated from their homeland on the island of Makian due to the threatened 
eruption of its volcano, Kie Besi. Subsequent actions involving Christian Tobelo and Muslim migrants on 
Halmahera could be interpreted analogously as stemming from indigene-settler tensions, although 
subsequently invoking religious difference to bring in wider support for each side. See Smith Alhadar, "The 
forgotten war in North Maluku: There's more than religion behind the troubles," Inside Indonesia 63 
(2000): 15.
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Within Central Sulawesi, the violence which has erupted around the city of Poso22 
may also be regarded as stemming as much from an indigene-settler opposition as from 
Christian-Muslim hostility. As throughout eastern Indonesia, in the Poso region these 
dimensions are mutually entangled, as autochthones tend to be Christians and a large 
proportion of migrants to be Muslim. The mutual alignment of these oppositions 
renders problematic the analysis of the genesis and reproduction of such violence in 
terms of discrete elements of the SARA complex (Suku, Agama, Ras dan 
Antargolongan—Ethnic Group, Religion, Race, and Interclass Relations), since these 
factors emerge as mutually reinforcing parameters.23 As in the case of Ambon, popular 
accounts have tended to elevate the second factor, Agama, to analytical prominence, 
but the way in which the indigene-migrant opposition in the Poso region also 
articulates cleavages of ethnicity and class centering on control of resources should not 
be neglected. In his thumbnail sketch of the region, David Rohde notes the effect not 
only of the influx of Javanese and Balinese due to transmigration, but also the influence 
wielded by spontaneous migrants moving in, as more land and other economic 
opportunities became available:
An isolated area once dominated by Christian members of the indigenous 
Pamona ethnic group was now the home of half a dozen large thriving ethnic 
groups. The Muslim population grew to equal the Christians . . . Over time, 
Muslim migrants aided by government resettlement programs and other settlers 
had gained economic and political power, prompting resentment among 
Christians native to the area. Muslim traders from South Sulawesi, members of 
the Bugis ethnic group, came to dominate the local market. Muslim farmers from 
Java prospered in villages around Poso.24
Such a situation produced heightened competition among now neighboring groups 
for local economic and political resources, exacerbated by the sale of land to these 
migrants due to the difficulties experienced by local To Pamona after the onset of the 
economic crisis in 1997.25
Yet, even given the catalyst of outside provocation, violence among these groups 
was not inevitable. Rohde's treatment of the Poso conflict poses a crucial question for 
analysis of the incidence of violence in the transitional Indonesia of the Reformasi era. 
Noting the lack of sustained violence in Manado, the capital of North Sulawesi four 
hundred kilometers to the north of Poso, despite the volatile situation in that city— 
which now hosts thousands of refugees, Christian and Muslim, from North Maluku, 
Maluku, and Poso itself—Rohde asks, "Why had one community been able to absorb 
provocation while the other exploded?"26 Indeed, Ambon, North Maluku, West and 
Central Kalimantan, and Poso are not the only regions where Christian and Muslim 
orientations collide and indigenous and settler interests compete. My intention in this 
paper is to interrogate this situation by exploring the larger contextual dynamics of one
22 See Lorraine V. Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish 
Eat People," in this issue.
23 Acciaioli, "Principles and Strategies of Bugis Migration," pp. 239, 241.
24 David Rohde, "Indonesia Unraveling?," Foreign Affairs 80,4 (2001): 113,121.
25 Ibid., p. 121.
26 Ibid., p. 112.
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locale: the Lindu plain in Central Sulawesi, situated only about 250 kilometers west of 
Poso, where violence has not erupted despite the coalescence of many of the same 
factors treated in these other contexts.
The Lindu plain has been inhabited since at least the seventeenth century by an 
ethnic group known by the same name.27 (I shall use the endonym To Lindu [to means 
person or people in the Tado language which they speak] to refer to this group, while 
using the term "Lindu people" to refer to all inhabitants of the plain, including 
subsequent migrants.) Migrant Bugis first began to settle the Lindu plain in the early 
1950s in a process of chain migration,28 beginning with an influx of refugees from the 
Kahar Muzakkar regional rebellion in South Sulawesi.29 By the 1970s, the Bugis had 
established economic dominance in the plain, first by successfully marketing the fish of 
the lake located centrally in the plain and then by using the proceeds of such 
enterprises to obtain land from the Lindu people through a variety of "compensation 
of loss" (ganti rugi) transactions. The Bugis established wet-rice fields on land irrigable 
by water sources emptying into the lake, and they planted cash crops—coffee, cloves 
and cacao—on other land further in the forest. In addition, many of the Bugis began 
operating as intermediate marketers of the products not only of their fellow Bugis 
community members, but also of the To Lindu and of other migrants to the area. To 
Lindu resentment of their entrepreneurial success has manifested itself in scattered 
minor incidents involving stoning of Bugis kiosks at various times in the last thirty 
years. However, only more recently has more overt violence threatened.30 Some To 
Lindu have urged the expulsion of the Bugis from the Lindu plain, while others, in the 
wake of reports on Poso and Ambon, now fear attacks from the Bugis community led 
by outside provocateurs from South Sulawesi. Understanding both the present context 
of fears of violence and the procedures invoked by the peoples of Lindu to avert it 
requires examining the larger context of regional autonomy in the Reformasi Era that has 
heightened competition among local groups for economic and political resources. We 
must also examine the competing frameworks for assessing rights to land and other 
natural resources31 that set the parameters for this competition among local groups.
27 Walter Kaudern, Migrations of the Toradja in Central Celebes (Ethnographical Studies in Celebes: Results 
of the Author's Expedition to Celebes 1917-1920, Vol II) (Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 
1925), p. 8.
28 Greg Acciaioli, "Searching for Good Fortune: The Making of a Bugis Shore Community at Lake Lindu, 
Central Sulawesi" (PhD dissertation, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 
1989).
29 Barbara Sillars Harvey, "Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965" (PhD 
dissertation, Cornell University, 1974).
30 Acciaioli, "Principles and Strategies of Bugis Migration," p. 258.
31 Greg Acciaioli, "Bugis Entrepreneurialism and Resource Use: Structure and Practice," Antropologi 
Indonesia 57 (1998): 81-91.
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Land Claims by the Customary Society (M asyarakat Adat) Movement in the 
Context of Regional Autonomy
The legislation concerning regional autonomy32 was introduced in the transitional 
era following the collapse of Suharto's regime as a response to the demands of various 
provinces to exercise greater control over their own resources and to receive a greater 
proportion of the revenue from their exploitation. Although most of the elements 
enumerated in the legislation are to be enacted at the level of the regency and province, 
one chapter of the legislation is concerned with reform at the administrative village 
(desa) level. In fact, in many ways this legislation defines the village level as that which 
most closely corresponds to an "autonomous region."33 The village is characterized as 
a territory having agriculture as its main activity and responsible for the management 
of natural resources; it also provides a place of rural settlement and exercises a system 
of territorial functions, including the rendering of government services, social services, 
and economic activities.34 This conceptualization of the village as itself an 
"autonomous region" has opened up the possibility of institutional reform enacted by 
villagers at this level, especially reform oriented to the control of local resources, 
including land for agriculture and other uses.
In some areas village-level reform has been implemented through a revival of what 
has been presented as customary (adat) institutions of governance. In its delineation of 
possibilities for reform at the village level, chapter XI of the regional autonomy 
legislation35 explicitly highlights the role of local custom. A village head (kepala desa) 
should fulfill all administrative duties not explicitly listed "in conformity with customs 
and traditions [adat istiadat] that have been organized in the regional regulations."36 
Significantly, this chapter omits mention of such village-level institutions as the LKMD 
(Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, or Village Society Security Institute) and LMD 
(Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, or Village Deliberations Institute), previously bulwarks 
of the New Order uniform administrative village system.37 Instead, all that does rate 
mention is a Village Representative Body (Badan Perwakilan Desa), the precise 
constitution of which is left purposefully vague. What is not vague is the designation of
32 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999 (UU No. 22 Tahun 1999 tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah, UU No. 25 Tahun 1999 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan 
Daerah, UU No. 28 Tahun 1999 tentang Penyelenggara Negara Yang Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, Kolusi 
dan Nepotisme) (Surabaya: Penerbit Arkola, 1999).
33 The parallelism of wording in definitions is striking. While an "autonomous region" (daerah otonom) is 
defined as "a unit of legal society that has definite regional boundaries [and] has authority to order and 
take care of the local interests of society according to its own initiatives based on the aspirations of society 
within the bonds of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia," an administrative village (desa) is "a 
unit of legal society that possesses authority to order and take care of the local interests of society based on 
the local origins and customs and traditions that are acknowledged in the National System of governance 
that exists at the regency [kabupaten] level." See ibid., pp. 4-5.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
35 Ibid., pp 35-40.
36 Ibid., p. 37.
37 The basis of this uniform village administrative system was established in two pieces of legislation, the 
1974 regional government law (Undang-undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1974 tentang Pokok-pokok Pemerintahan di 
Daerah) and the 1979 village government law (Undang-undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan 
Desa).
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its first "function to protect local customs and traditions."38 Indeed, a primary aim of 
the regency government regulations as a whole is to "recognize and honor the rights, 
origins and customs and traditions of the Village."39 40This acknowledgment of the 
centrality of local custom (adat) constitutes one of the most significant recognitions of 
the autonomy legislation in the current era of Reformasi. It opens up a political space 
for the replacement of once nationally uniform institutions, local conduits of 
nationalist allegiance, by regionally variable organizations and procedures of 
governance that encode community aspirations in terms of adherence to local custom. 
But it also establishes the grounds of potential conflict by leaving unaddressed the 
issue of how the various constituencies in multi-ethnic villages, not all of whom may 
acknowledge the same adat, will be able to insure that they themselves are represented 
and their resource rights protected in new systems of village governance.
Concurrent with this legislation, in fact both influencing its emphases and further 
gaining momentum from its enactment, has been the nationwide movement for the 
reassertion of the rights of "customary societies" (masyarakat adat).i0 Although an 
incipient movement fostered by several NGOs from the early 1990s, this movement 
came of age with the holding of the "Congress of Archipelagic Customary Societies" 
(Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, or KMAN) in Jakarta, from March 15 to 22, 
1999. The first "fact sheet" that this congress issued constituted a manifesto of its 
aims. It concentrated upon the efforts of these societies to gain recognition for various 
types of rights—"rights of origin, rights over customary territory, rights of upholding a 
value system, ideology and customs and traditions, economic rights, and most 
importantly the political right of customary societies to defend and develop then- 
special cultures"—that they felt had been "unjustly and undemocratically 
expropriated" by the New Order regime.41 Accusing the central government of
38 Government of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999, p. 39.
39 Ibid., p. 41.
40 Tania Murray Li translates the term masyarakat adat as "literally, people who adhere to customary 
ways." Tania Murray Li, "Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's 
Forest Zone," Modern Asian Studies 35,3 (2001): 645. Although Li's translation as "people" seems more 
appropriate for the term bangsa, which would also have the connotations of "nation" (see Greg Acciaioli, 
"'Archipelagic Culture' as an Exclusionary Government Discourse in Indonesia," The Asia Pacific Journal 
of Anthropology 2,1 (2001): 1-23), I prefer to use the term society/ies in my gloss to accord with the 
definition of masyarakat adat formally accepted at KMAN: "social groups [kelompok] that have ancestral 
origins (which have persisted for generations) in a specific geographical territory [ivilayah], along with 
possessing a value system, ideology, economy, politics, culture, society and territory of their own." KMAN 
[Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara], Fact Sheet II (1999), p. 1. As this definition indicates, the current 
Indonesian term, masyarakat adat, is largely a translation of the Dutch colonial term adatgemeenschap, as 
used by van Vollenhoven and other scholars of the conservative Leiden school, the foundation of which 
was established in van Vollenhoven's PhD thesis: Comelis van Vollenhoven, "Flet adatrecht der inlanders 
in de jurisprudentie, 1849-1912"( PhD dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1912). An accessible 
introduction to this school in English is: Barend ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, trans. E. Adamson Hoebel 
and A. Arthur Schiller (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948). See the section below entitled 
"Settler Contestation of To Lindu Adat Claims to Land" for a discussion of the problems involved in the 
revival of Adatrecht [D] perspectives under the Indonesian rubric hukum adat by the current masyarakat adat 
movement.
41 KMAN [Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara], Fact Sheet I (1999), p. 1. Taken from M-PR Consultant, 
Report on Communications and Information Dissemination in Support of National Conggress [sic] of 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Jakarta: PT. Madah Paranpara Rancang, n.d.).
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imposing laws and policies that have "hegemonic qualities" and of monopolizing 
allegiance in the name of "national sovereignty/' in their opening manifesto the 
conference organizers declared their purpose of re-establishing the "sovereignty of 
customary societies" as a complementary node of allegiance. Such reassertion of local 
sovereignty was proclaimed as a more appropriate realization of the original 
nationalist aim of promoting "mutual respect and working together toward a strong 
nation" in the context of the "variety of cultures and plurality of local systems in 
Indonesia," as encoded in the national motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" (usually 
translated as "Unity in Diversity").42
In addition to striving for a proper recognition of their place as the ultimate social 
building blocks (the "last fortresses" of the national order, properly understood), the 
"customary societies" represented at the congress particularly concentrated upon 
asserting their "customary right to territory and the natural resources in it."43 The 
expropriation of their resources through the monopolistic policies of "collusion, 
corruption, and nepotism" used by the "centralistic and authoritarian (militaristic)" 
New Order state was declared a "transgression of basic human rights." Setting forth 
an agenda oriented to "basic human rights, democratization, natural resources/ 
environment," the organizing committee devoted the first two days of the congress to 
three preliminary discussions, covering (1) regional autonomy and customary 
governance, (2) customary land (tanah adat), and (3) basic human rights and the 
politics of customary societies.44 In the second of these seminars, discussion centered 
on the articulation of three basic demands: the rescinding of all laws and regulations 
that inflicted losses on customary societies; the acknowledgment and protection of 
rights to customary land; and the requirement that individuals and organizations seek 
permission from local customary societies for all forms of use and ownership of 
customary land.45
Concentration upon the rights of customary societies to oversee the use of local 
resources, especially land, constituted a clear stream of concern throughout the 
congress as a whole. Four of the twelve economic demands46 issued at the end of the 
conference explicitly referred to land or the use of natural resources related to it. They 
specifically advocated the rejection of monoculture farming systems, the 
reappropriation by local authorities of the right to manage all natural resources, and 
the reclamation by customary societies of various types of land and natural resources 
that had been allocated to other uses by the central government, including "conversion 
land" (tanah konversi, or land granted to Western concerns), and land given over to 




45 Sandra Kartika and Candra Gautama, eds., Menggugat Posisi Masyarakat Adat terhadap Negara: 
Prosiding Sarasehan Masyarakat Adat Nusantara Jakarta, 15-16 Maret 1999 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Aliansi 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara [AMAN], 1999), p. 176.
46 For a translation and discussion of the full list of economic demands issued by the Congress of 
Archipelagic Customary Societies, see Greg Acciaioli, "Re-empowering the 'Art of the Elders': The 
Revitalization of Adat among the Lindu People of Central Sulawesi," in Beyond Java: Regional Autonomy 
and Local Societies in Indonesia, ed. Minako Sakai (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, in press).
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industrial plantation concessions (HTI, Hutan Tanaman Industri, or Industrial 
Plantation Forests), and other types of concessions.47 The Alliance of Archipelagic 
Customary Societies (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, or AMAN), the 
organization that sprang from the congress, declared that the reclamation by local 
communities of ultimate jurisdiction over the bestowal and use of land not under 
permanent cultivation (hak ulayat, the Indonesian form of the colonial Dutch legal term, 
beschikkingsrecht) would be one of its most important goals.48 The need to force central 
government recognition of customary land rights as no longer subordinate to state 
interests emerged as one of the most significant demands of the masyarakat adat 
movement, constituting "a claim for the sovereignty of customary societies over their 
territories."49
This movement has been able to put forth such demands due to some crucial 
ambiguities in the agrarian legislation of 1960, originally intended as a basic land 
reform document. Despite an ambitious preamble declaring that the legislation aimed 
to supersede colonial laws in this sector50 and to overcome the Dutch legal policy of 
dualism, which had separated Western law (hukum barat) from local customary law 
(hukum adat),51 in many ways this legislation only succeeded in creating an uneasy 
tension between these two sources of law. Indeed, its opening "opinion" explicitly 
noted "the necessity of the existence of a national agrarian law that is based upon 
customary law concerning land, which is simple and insures legal certainty for all of 
the Indonesian people, without neglecting the elements that are dependent upon 
religious law."52 However, once its central stipulations began to be listed, it became 
clear that this legislation sought to subordinate local customary law to national 
interests. As stated, "the land, water and air, including all the natural riches to be 
found in them, are controlled at the highest level by the state as the organization of 
power [organisasi kekuasaan] of all the people."53 This ultimate "right of control" was 
part of the state's arrogation of sovereignty for the declared purpose of achieving 
prosperity and justice for all the people of Indonesia.54
47 KMAN, "12 Tuntutan Ekonomi Masyarakat Adat," Pelita Bangsa, March 19,1999. (Pelita Bangsa was 
the name of the newsletter issued for participants each day of KMAN.)
48 Noer Fauzi, "Sengketa Tenurial atas Tanah dan Kekayaan Alam Kepunyaan Masysarkat Adat/' in 
Menggugat Posisi Masyarakat Adat terhadap Negara, p. 186; Ardian Taufik Gesuri, Eddy Suprapto, and 
Bagus Marsudi, "Kembalikan Tanah Kami: Masyarakat adat meminta kekuasaan tanah ulayat/' Kontan, 
March 19,1999, p. 30.
49 Fauzi, "Sengketa Tenurial atas Tanah dan Kekayaan Alam Kepunyaan Masysarkat Adat," p. 186.
50 Under the terms of the 1870 Dutch colonial agricultural law (Agrarische Wet [D]), foreigners, including 
the Dutch, were limited to long-term leases (erfpacht [D]). See Hiroyoshi Kano, Land Tenure System and the 
Desa Community in Nineteenth-Century Java (IDE Special Papers No. 5) (Tokyo: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1977), p. 5. However, these were easily obtained at cheap rates, often with villages coerced into 
such arrangements (Benedict Anderson, personal communication).
51 Government of Indonesia, Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok 
Agraria (n.p., n.d.), pp. 4-5.
52 Government of Indonesia, Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok 
Agraria, p. 1.
53 Ibid.
54 "The people's prosperity" is defined as "nationalism, safety, and independence within the society and 
legal State of a free, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesia." Ibid., p. 6.
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The ascription of ultimate sovereignty to the state in matters concerning the control 
and use of resources is precisely what the current customary society movement has 
sought to contest as part of its reassertion of the competing sovereignty (kedaulatan) of 
customary societies. In practice, the 1960 agrarian law has had this result: all land that 
is not given over to inhabitation or used in permanent cultivation, encompassing both 
wet-rice cultivation and tree crops, has been declared state land (tanah Negara). The 
state thus reserves the ultimate right of disposal, trumping traditional practices that 
would allocate land under jurisdictional rights of access (hak ulayat) dictated by local 
custom. For example, temporarily unallocated, fallow swidden fields and forest areas 
which local peoples have used for gathering wood, rattan, medicinal herbs, and other 
resources, could be, and have often been, declared by the state as open land available 
for such purposes as transmigration sites, forestry concessions, and other uses. In such 
decisions, the status of "customary land," much of which covers precisely these types 
of uncultivated land subject to local regulation by adat councils, has been largely 
ignored.55 Any form of customary control over land and other resources could only be 
exercised if permission was directly bestowed by the state: "The autonomous regions 
and customary societies can be authorized [dikuasakan] with the above-mentioned right 
of control by the state, insofar as it is necessary and is not in conflict with national 
interests, according to the decisions of Government Regulations."56 The state's 
delegation of authority over such land is guided by its assessment of its own national 
interests, and usage must accord with those national interests. Of course, those 
interests are so broadly defined—covering religious needs, social and cultural needs of 
society, needs of agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industry, transmigration, and mining, 
as well as any other needs of the state57—that ultimately the state can justify most any 
assertion of its authority in land allocation issues.
Yet, the 1960 agrarian legislation itself is crucially ambiguous in regard to the 
ultimate basis of such control. Contrasting with the stipulations mentioned above, 
section five of the very same legislation appears to reverse the order of legal 
empowerment, declaring the basis of operative agrarian law to be existing customary 
laws, as long as they do not conflict with national interests, Indonesian socialism, 
agrarian and other laws, and religious law 58 It is precisely such ambiguities that the 
customary society movement plays upon in the current move to restore customary land
55 In some cases compensation has been paid to people designated as customary owners, but not at any 
market rate. The declaration of such land as simply state land (tanah Negara) is another aspect in which the 
1960 Indonesian agrarian law continued Dutch colonial practice, as first codified in the 
"Domeinverklaring [D] of 1870, which declared all unclaimed and forest lands as the domain of the state." 
See Nancy Lee Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), p. 50. Such declarations parallel how other colonial regimes, as well 
as postcolonial governments in their wake, have often regarded land not permanently cultivated, largely 
land not subject to individual ownership, as "empty" and hence available for uses deemed fit by the state, 
such as agricultural settlement or pastoral leases (e.g. terra nullius [L] in Australia). See Bruce C. Campbell 
and Bu V. E. Wilson, The Politics of Exclusion: Indonesian Fishing in the Australian Fishing Zone (Indian 
Ocean Centre for Peace Studies Publications, No. 5) (Perth: Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies and the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 1993), pp. 56-60.
56 Government of Indonesia, Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok 
Agraria, p. 6.
57 Ibid., p. 9.
58 Ibid., p. 7.
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as a recognized category of land over which local societies can exercise sovereign 
rights. The movement's advocates argue that such policies are more in accord with the 
philosophical basis of Indonesian nationalism.59 However, in a changed natural and 
social landscape, one rendered more complex by such government policies as national 
transmigration and local resettlement, demands for the revival of local custom as the 
basis of land adjudication have turned out to be immensely problematic. The potential 
for conflict in such issues is illustrated by the contesting views of entitlement to land 
among the peoples settled in the Lindu plain in the western highlands of Central 
Sulawesi, including indigenous To Lindu wet-rice farmers, spontaneous migrants from 
South Sulawesi, the majority of whom are Bugis pursuing livelihoods as fisherfolk, 
farmers, and intermediate traders, and migrants from the surrounding areas of Kulawi 
subdistrict who have been brought to the plain under various government-organized 
resettlement programs.
Re-emerging Local Autonomy among the To Lindu
The To Lindu of Central Sulawesi have been at the forefront of the customary 
society movement at the provincial level since its inception in the 1990s. The co-head 
of the provincial branch of AMAN is a young To Lindu man, while the head of the 
independent (but often cooperating) organization, AMASUTA (Aliansi Masyarakat 
Adat Sulawesi Tengah, or Alliance of Central Sulawesi Customary Societies) is also 
from the same ethnic group. Both of these men, while hailing from different villages and 
differing widely in their outlooks upon the proper constitution of adat councils, have 
had considerable experience working with NGOs in the provincial capital, Palu, a 
factor that is significant in assessing the prominent role of the To Lindu in this 
movement generally. The To Lindu have long been aware of the significance of their 
adat as a badge of their ethnicity; during the New Order, they entered various adat 
competitions sponsored by the provincial government (in fact, winning one of them) at 
which performance of dances and other displays of "culture as art"60 were judged for 
their value in contributing to the national development effort. However, they first 
became aware that their adat could be used as a "weapon"61 in political battles over 
control of resources when the forest region surrounding the Lindu plain was declared 
the Lore Lindu National Park in 1982.62 That designation entailed the prohibition of
59 KMAN, Fact Sheet I (1999), p. 1.
60 Greg Acciaioli, "Culture as Art: From practice to spectacle in Indonesia," Canberra Anthropology 
(Special volume: Minorities and the State, ed. Douglas Miles and Chris Eipper) 8 ,1 /2  (1985): 148-174.
61 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985).
62 Originally the Lindu plain was to be incorporated into a somewhat differently configured national park, 
the Lore Kalamanta National Park, based upon the Lore Kalamanta Game Reserve, first established in 
1973. See J. H. Blower, Jan Wind, and Harry Amir, Proposed Lore Kalamanta National Park Management Plan 
1978/79-1980/81 (Report prepared by the Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Project of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for the Directorate of Nature Conservation, 
Directorate-General of Forestry, Republic of Indonesia, 1977). The regulations of the original game reserve 
were only desultorily enforced during the 70s, with the boundaries of the proposed national park being 
eventually considered unsatisfactory. It was replaced by the Lore Lindu National Park, a composite of 
three formerly separate Reserves—Suaka Margasatwa Lore Kalamanta, and Hutan Wisata/Lindung 
Danau Lindu—and the Suaka Margasatwa Lore Kalamanta extension. See Dick Watling and Yaya
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such activities as collecting rattan—not to mention extending wet-rice fields and coffee 
gardens—in the surrounding forest included in the park.63 Such strictures actually had 
a greater impact upon more recent migrants to the area who were still in the process of 
opening fields, including both Bugis from South Sulawesi, who had migrated 
spontaneously, and To Pipikoro, To Kulawi, and To Winatu migrants, who had come 
to the area under local resettlement schemes within Kulawi subdistrict. However, the 
To Lindu also felt that these regulations were an assault upon their traditional ways of 
using and protecting the environment as given in adat. The government did eventually 
grant "enclave" status within the national park boundaries for the agricultural region, 
and it established a border zone of surrounding forest, thus providing a compromise 
whereby all the Lindu people were able to maintain their fields and have access to 
some forest products.
Provincial plans, first announced at the end of 1988, to build a hydroelectric 
project (PLTA Palu III) on the Gumbasa River near the outlet of Lake Lindu to support 
the future industrialization of Palu64 provided the impetus for a much more 
comprehensive resistance to government development plans. When the provincial 
government, invoking justifications typical for dam projects and other development 
projects imposed by the New Order,65 informed the inhabitants of the plain that they 
would have to relocate under a resettlement scheme for the greater good of the people 
of the Palu region, since the reservoir created by the hydroelectric dam would swamp 
their homes and fields, the To Lindu and other peoples settled in the plain simply 
refused. Whereas the Bugis migrants to the Lindu plain threatened to take up arms to 
defend their rice fields and coffee stands rather than leave, the To Lindu chose instead 
to pursue legal avenues for asserting their rights, as advised by a number of NGOs 
operating from the provincial capital, Palu.
The To Lindu were among the beneficiaries of the blossoming of the NGO 
movement in Indonesia in the early 1990s, when the surveillance orientation of the New 
Order with regard to NGOs was yielding, under international pressure, to a more 
"sympathetic" attitude.66 Spearheading the drive to assist the Lindu people was the 
local NGO Yayasan Tanah Merdeka (YTM, or The Foundation for Independent Land), 
although it worked as part of a network of other NGOs, some Palu-based (e.g. 
Yayasan Palu Hijau, or The Foundation for a Green Palu) and some with home offices 
in Jakarta (e.g. WALHI [Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, or Indonesian Forum 
for the Environment], Yayasan Sejati [The Authentic Peoples' Foundation]), as well as 
the local branch of the Indonesia-wide Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute).
Mulyana, Lore Lindu National Park Management Plan 1981 -1986  (Report prepared by the World Wildlife 
Fund—Indonesia Programme [Bogor] for the Directorate of Nature Conservation, Directorate General of 
Forestry, Republic of Indonesia, 1981).
63 Watling and Mulyana, Lore Lindu National Park Management Plan 1981 -1986, p. 36.
64 Arianto Sangaji, PLTA Lore Lindu: Orang Lindu Menolak Pindah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar kerjasama 
dengan Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, ED Walhi Sulawesi Tengah, 2000).
65 George J. Aditjondro, "Large dam victims and their defenders: the emergence of an anti-dam movement in 
Indonesia," in The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia: Resources and Resistance, ed. Philip Hirsch 
and Carol Warren (Routledge: London and New York, 1998), pp. 29-54.
66 Philip Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 32.
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With coaching from these NGOs, especially YTM, To Lindu representatives explicitly 
based their resistance to the hydroelectric project on the superior benefits of their adat 
for protecting the environment, compared to the regulations proceeding from 
government-directed development. Working with representatives of the three To Lindu 
villages—members of the village adat councils were prominent among these 
representatives—YTM was able to mount a series of legal challenges to the Lindu dam 
project. These efforts culminated in a political expedition to Jakarta in 1995 by 
representatives who visited the national legislature, the National Committee on Human 
Rights (Komnas HAM, or Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia), the central office of 
the National Electric Company, the forestry minister, and the minister for mines and 
energy. As a result, this group of To Lindu youths and elders and YTM workers gained 
central government assurance that the Lindu hydroelectric project could not proceed 
on the grounds that it had not been included within any five-year plan.67
While this trip was important because it gave To Lindu representatives an 
experience of success acting on a national stage, other encounters facilitated by YTM 
made the representatives aware of an even wider context—an international context— 
that could help them evaluate and refine their political strategies for defending 
customary rights. In a tour organized by YTM to the Kedung Ombo site in Central Java, 
To Lindu elders had the opportunity to converse with Javanese who had experienced 
the full effect of a dam project that had also required resettlement. Indeed, the 
development of solidarity with other oppressed groups, both within Indonesia and 
beyond, has been one of the primary aims of the YTM strategy to raise a consciousness 
among the To Lindu that they are not alone in their struggle, but are just one example 
of an "indigenous people" subjected to unjust depredations by a government with a 
history of ignoring the welfare of indigenous peoples in their own lands. YTM has 
sought to foster identification with the struggles of indigenous peoples throughout the 
world against development projects, especially large-scale dams requiring the removal 
of peoples from their homelands,68 and even the dislocations of populations required 
by the erection of national parks.69 The success of this strategy was evidenced when 
one To Lindu informant I interviewed at Lindu in January 2000 mentioned the 
analogous situation of Amazonian Indians as we were discussing the rumors of the 
new governor's attempt to resurrect the hydroelectric dam project on a smaller scale.70
YTM has claimed for the To Lindu a local realization of the "traditional wisdom" 
(kearifan tradisional) that permeates discourses of and upon "indigenous peoples" or
67 Besides being based on interviews with elders at Lindu and with Drs. Arianto Sangaji, the head of YTM, 
this section also summarizes (all too briefly) the bound collection of 161 newspaper clippings entitled 
Kumpulan Berita dan Opini tentang Rencana Pembangunan PLTA Lindu dan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu 
(Palu: WALHI, Forum Daerah, Sulawesi Tengah, no date given), as well as material in Sangaji, PLTA Lore 
Lindu.
68 George J. Aditjondro, "Suatu kritik terhadap teori dan praktek analisa dampak lingkungan (ADL) 
bendungan-bendungan besar," in Bendungan Rakyat dan Lingkungan: Catatan Kritis Rencana Pembangunan 
PLTA Lore Lindu, ed. Arianto Sangadji (Jakarta: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia [WALHI], 1994), 
pp. 25-85.
69 Jason W. Clay, "Parks and People," Cultural Survival Quarterly 9,1 (1985): 2-5; Horst Eilers, "Protected 
Areas and Indigenous Peoples," Cultural Survival Quarterly 9,1 (1985): 6-9.
70 Anonymous, "Menggagas Kembali PLTA Danau Lindu," Formasi, Desember 1999.
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"first nations."71 This political line of indigeneity has allowed the To Lindu to assume 
a recognizable "tribal slot"72 with all its connotations of "traditional wisdom/' 
especially as related to the environment. YTM publications73 have thus emphasized 
how To Lindu adat functions as a community-based resource management system. For 
example, Laudjeng outlines how the Lindu plain is partitioned into a number of 
indigenously specified land-use domains (suaka [T?]74) that function to promote the 
"conservation of the region"; outsiders who wish to make use of such land must seek 
permission from To Lindu custodians and even then may only put it to uses allowed 
by adat.75 My own investigations in August, 2000, revealed a division of uncultivated 
land into two types, pancua ntodea [T] and pancua maradika [T] (todea and maradika 
refer to the commoner and noble strata, respectively). Whereas the former land is open 
to all for gathering firewood or rattan and similar tasks, use of the latter requires 
permission of the local nobles. For example, one would have to ask permission of the 
nobles of a village to graze one's cattle on their pancua maradika and once again to 
remove one's cattle from it after grazing. Failure to observe these restrictions would 
result in being fined (ragizvu [T]) by the local village adat council, the predominant form 
of sanction for most all transgressions.76 This system of monitoring land use was 
explicitly presented to me as an instance of indigenous provisions for protecting the 
environment from degradation through overgrazing and other damaging practices.
Other stretches of land designated as the preserves of local guardian spirits (tana 
viata [T]) may not be subjected to any forms of exploitation, whether this would 
involve opening gardens for coffee or cacao or chopping down trees to obtain wood for 
building canoes or for other construction purposes. Even when their Salvation Army 
convictions lead them to doubt the status of viata, middle-aged and younger members 
of the To Lindu community now present such interdiction as evidence of the local 
ecological wisdom encoded in adat institutions. As many of these indigenous sacred
71 David Maybury-Lewis, Millennium: Tribal Wisdom and the Modern World (New York: Viking, 1992).
72 Tania Murray Li, "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 42,1 (2000): 163-168.
73 For example, Arianto Sangadji, Menyorot PLTA Lore Lindu (Palu: Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, 1996) and 
Arianto Sangadji, ed., Bendungan Rakyat dan Lingkungan.
74 Although To Lindu informants, young and old, insist that suaka is an indigenous term in their Tado 
language, the word does occur in official publications as a label for various environmental zones 
throughout Indonesia, including the names of reserves that were amalgamated to produce the Lore Lindu 
National Park (see note 62 above). The Indonesian-English dictionary compiled by Echols and Shadily lists 
its meanings as "asylum" and "sanctuary." See John Echols and Hassan Shadily (compilers), Kamus 
Indonesia Inggris, 3rd edition (Jakarta: Penerbit PT Gramedia, 1990), p. 527. Poerwadarminta's 
comprehensive dictionary lists only the former definition. See W. J. S. Poerwadarminta (compiler), Kamus 
Umum Bahasa Indonesia, 5th revised printing (Jakarta: PN Balai Pustaka, 1976), p. 966. Hence, I assume its 
environmental meaning is a relatively recent extension. Either this is a rare example of a Tado cognate 
having exactly the same form as in Indonesian (which would contravene phonological rules of 
correspondence) or a term that is part of general environmentalist discourse in Indonesian has become so 
identified with contemporary To Lindu conceptualizations of the environment that its exogenous origin has 
been forgotten. Since I cannot find a similar term in word lists of Kaili, Uma and Bare'e, all closely related 
languages of the area, I think the latter explanation more likely.
75 H. Laudjeng, "Kearifan Tradisional Masyarakat Adat Lindu," in Bendungan Rakyat dan Lingkungan, pp. 
150-163.
76 Acciaioli, "Re-empowering the 'Art of the Elders/"
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areas are located in the surrounding forest, these informants point to the function of 
tana viata, and the encompassing system of suaka in which it finds its place, in 
preserving watershed areas and thus inhibiting the erosion and the sedimentation that 
have been decreasing the depth of Lake Lindu, as evidenced by its noticeably receding 
shoreline. Indeed, some To Lindu explicitly assert that migrants to the area who cut 
down forests and open up coffee and cacao gardens, heedless of To Lindu adat 
prohibitions, have contributed to the increasing shallowness of the lake and the 
streams feeding into it. Local developers arguing for the erection of a new, 
environmentally less destructive hydroelectric scheme and for a water cleansing 
installation just below it to provide potable water for Palu have had to make 
accommodations in their plans to preserve tana suaka [T] under the jurisdiction of the 
To Lindu adat councils. The To Lindu, in cooperation with their NGO allies, have thus 
experienced considerable success in reasserting their rights, based on their claimed 
ancestral connection to their land and their ecological wisdom in preserving its 
resources77 against the imposition of development schemes. Their efforts have both 
limited the regulations of the encompassing Lore-Lindu National Park and thwarted 
the incursion of a hydro-electric scheme that would have forced their resettlement. 
However, other people more recently settled in the Lindu plain have been less 
impressed by these arguments and continue to contest what they see as presumptuous 
To Lindu claims of ultimate jurisdiction over local land and its resources.
Settler Contestation of To Lindu Adat Claims to Land
Previous sections have alluded to the presence of other peoples within the Lindu 
plain, both spontaneous migrants, predominant among them the Bugis from South 
Sulawesi,78 and resettlers79 from within Kulawi subdistrict (the Lindu Plain is located 
in the Kulawi subdistrict). In this regard the Lindu plain is certainly not untypical. 
Few, if any, regions of contemporary Indonesia are ethnically homogeneous, in part due 
to spontaneous migration, in part to such social engineering projects of the Indonesian 
state as transmigrasi and resetelmen. Nor are such policies recent inventions of the 
postcolonial Indonesian state. Many of them have merely continued Dutch schemes for 
resettling mountain peoples into more administratively accessible areas and, 
concurrently, into more nucleated residential arrangements, as well as colonial schemes 
for encouraging interisland transmigration of Javanese and Balinese into less populated
77 Li, "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia," p. 164.
78 Acciaioli, "Searching for Good Fortune," concentrates upon patterns of migration of the Bugis to Lake 
Lindu, as well as their efforts to control the local economy as intermediate marketers of fish, rice, coffee, 
and other products and to reshape the local Lindu spiritual universe by such means as ascribing Bugis 
genealogies to local guardian spirits.
79 The term resetelmen (i.e. resettlement) is currently favoured by the Social Affairs Department 
(Departemen Sosial or DEPSOS) for the programs it administers to move peoples living in remote areas, 
often on the slopes of mountains where they can only practice slash-and-bum cultivation, to areas closer to 
administrative centers where they can better perform their "social function" as Indonesian citizens, 
including growing wet rice whose surplus they can sell for cash, attending houses of religious worship, 
sending their children to school, etc. However, both officials and participants also refer to such programs, 
at least locally in Central Sulawesi, as transmigrasi lokal. See Johanis Haba, "Resettlement and 
Sociocultural Change among the 'Isolated Peoples' in Central-Sulawesi, Indonesia: A Study of Three 
Resettlement Sites" (PhD dissertation, University of Western Australia, 1998).
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regions such as Lampung80 and Central Sulawesi81; these Dutch efforts to rearrange the 
Indonesian population were especially marked after the "Ethical Policy" was 
instituted at the beginning of this century, leading to more extensive colonial 
penetration and intensive control of the subject population.82 Along with the 
encouragement of spontaneous migration, such schemes have long rendered most 
regions in Indonesia ethnically heterogeneous. And in contexts of ethnic heterogeneity, 
the question that always arises in regard to the re-emergence of the authority of 
customary institutions and stipulations in local governance is, of course, just whose 
adat is to have precedence?
It is a question which the Indonesian government has yet to answer satisfactorily. 
Official Indonesian reactions to the rise of the customary society movement were 
evident in the government-sponsored establishment of a Center for Research into 
Custom (Pusat Kajian Adat), headed by the noted Indonesian sociologist, Professor 
Selo Soemardjan. His designated task was to study just how adat might be revived as 
the basis for implementing the regional autonomy legislation in rural areas. In a keynote 
address at a recent workshop and symposium entitled "The Beginning of the 21st 
Century: Endorsing Regional Autonomy, Understanding Local Cultures, Strengthening 
National Integration,"83 he explained how he was seeking the basis for policy 
recommendations not only from his fieldwork in Central Javanese villages (Professor 
Soemardjan himself hails from Central Java), but also by returning to the Dutch 
conceptualizations of the Leiden School of Adatrecht, associated most fully with the 
work of van Vollenhoven. For example, Professor Soemardjan made reference to the 
delineation of "customary law regions" (adatrechtskringen [D]) and other conceptual 
bases of this school. His approach to implementing contemporary government 
recognition of adat was thus to be based on this conservative colonial legal tradition. 
However, Indonesia today (and perhaps not even in van Vollenhoven's time) cannot 
easily be segmented into clearly bounded "customary law regions," since few (if any) 
areas within the archipelago are mono-ethnic, even such relatively isolated areas as the 
Lindu plain. And the more recent settlers in many of these areas, especially in the case 
of those transported under the auspices of local resetelmen programs, such as the To 
Lonca, To Pipikoro, and To Kulawi now resettled in the Lindu plain, are also peoples 
who themselves claim "customary society" status even though they may not fulfill the 
criterion of maintaining their ties to ancestral origins by persisting for generations in a 
specific geographic region, as promulgated by KMAN.84 Among the greatest challenges 
facing the peoples of these ethnically heterogeneous areas, rife with the potential for 
conflict, is just how the claims of competing forms of adat within particular locales 
may be adjudicated.
80 Karl Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics (New York: American Geographical Society, 1945).
81 Gloria Davis, "Parigi: A Social History of the Balinese Movement to Central Sulawesi, 1907-1974" 
(PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1976).
82 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia c. 1300 to the present (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 
1981), pp. 143-154.
83 Held from August 1-4,2000, at Hasanuddin University in Makassar, South Sulawesi, this conference 
was co-organized by the editorial committee of the journal Antropologi Indonesia, which is produced by the 
Anthropology Department of Universitas Indonesia in Depok, and the Anthropology Department of 
Hasanuddin University.
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This question has been particularly problematic in relation to land issues at Lindu, 
and indeed throughout the archipelago. Aragon has nicely delineated how in contexts 
of extensive resettlement, which she characterizes as "state-imposed forms of 
deterritorialization," "conflicts arise and often remain unresolved because each group 
seemingly tries to retain its own criteria concerning founders and precedence."84 5 For 
example, the Palolo Valley—a site, coincidentally, adjacent to the Lindu plain in the 
mountains to the southeast of Palu—has been populated only in the last half-century 
by peoples from throughout the Palu Valley and the mountains surrounding it. Kaili 
settlers from the Palu Valley base their claims to precedence in land allocation on the 
former inclusion of the Palolo Valley within the periphery of Sigi, a precolonial Kaili 
rajahdom. Resettlers to Palolo from the more isolated Tobaku area in the western 
mountains of Kulawi subdistrict "envision the [Palolo] project territory as akin to a 
'wild' area, harnessed by the state, in which they were the founding occupants."86 The 
lowland Kaili migrants feel they have the first right to claim land in Palolo because 
they regard such land as located within the ambit of former Kaili domains; the Tobaku, 
on the other hand, consider that their rights to land have precedence in this territory 
because they were the first to occupy "empty" sites under the government auspices of 
resettlement programs.
Given the current diversity of its inhabitants, similar conflicts have arisen in the 
Lindu plain. The To Lindu quest to impose their own "indigenous" adat, on the basis 
of their original occupation of the Lindu plain, as the final reference point for all land 
issues in the locale has certainly not met with universal acceptance from the plain's 
other inhabitants. To Lindu seek to implement this claim mainly through the vehicle of 
the Lembaga Hadat se-Dataran Lindu, the recently re-empowered Customary Council 
for the Entire Lindu Plain. They assert that this council represents all the inhabitants of 
the Lindu plain,87 although its members only come from the noble (maradika) ranks of 
the To Lindu in the three administrative villages with majority To Lindu populations. 
To Lindu now argue that all land transactions must be ratified by the head of this 
plain-wide council or by a leader of one of the three village-level adat councils. In the 
views of members of these councils, whereas To Lindu can buy land through a 
payment to a relevant adat council, no outsiders can ever buy land; non-To Lindu can 
only acquire use rights (hak pakai) through the agreement of a relevant adat council. 
Needless to say, migrants from South Sulawesi and from elsewhere in Kulawi 
subdistrict who have acquired land from To Lindu individuals through ganti rugi 
payments disagree. They regard such payments as constituting purchase of the land, 
resulting in a right of ownership (hak milik). In fact, some of the Bugis have already 
gone through all the bureaucratic procedures to obtain land certificates from the
84 Note 40 translates KMAN's definition of masyarakat adat.
85 Lorraine Aragon, "Expanding Spiritual Territories: Owners of the Land, Missionization and Migration 
in Central Sulawesi," in Founder's Cults in Southeast Asia: Ancestors, Agriculture, and Polity, ed. Nicola 
Tannenbaum and Cornelia Kammerer (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Program, in press).
86 Aragon, "Expanding Spiritual Territories."
87 During the New Order period the adat council for the entire Lindu plain was largely dormant, as cases 
that could still be dealt with under the terms of adat were handled individually by the adat councils 
(lembaga hadat) of the three administrative villages (desa) with majority To Lindu populations— Anca, 
Tornado, and Langko—in accord with the emphasis upon desa institutions enshrined in the 1974 and 1979 
national legislation on regional and village governance.
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government. The To Lindu, arguing that all local land is ultimately under the 
jurisdiction of the Lembaga Hadat, with no individual having exclusive ownership 
rights, are now beginning to contest the transactions that migrants have made with To 
Lindu individuals and that they have sought to confirm officially through government 
channels. To date the status of such land remains unresolved; questions regarding 
ultimate sovereignty over the land are still being contested, as each side is sure of its 
own interpretation of its rights.
The issue of who has the right ultimately to determine disposal of land and set 
limits on its use came to a head at a meeting of representatives of all the communities 
on the plain, both the majority To Lindu villages and those settlements, such as 
Kanawu, occupied predominantly by spontaneous Bugis migrants, as well as those, 
such as Puroo, inhabited by resettlers and spontaneous migrants from elsewhere in 
Kulawi. At that meeting the village head from Puroo vehemently rejected the Lindu 
adat council's move to enforce a stipulation, announced as a restoration of Lindu adat, 
limiting land use (or ownership, in the migrants' view) to two hectares per individual. 
As this village head argued, why shouldn't farmers be allowed to have ten hectares or 
more of land, as long as they are capable (mampu) of working it all? Land use (and 
ultimately ownership) should be limited only by ability, as is in accord with national 
priorities of development (pembangunan) and progress (kemajuan). This migrant 
viewpoint thus echoed a part of the theory of modernization underlying the 
developmentalist rationale of the New Order, which invoked and praised the efforts of 
pioneer entrepreneurs. Lindu adat representatives, presenting the environmentalist 
position that interprets local custom as a community resource management system, as 
inculcated by the NGOs, defended the two-hectare limitation by noting the extent to 
which the opening of gardens in the hills to the south of the lake by To Kulawi settlers 
from Puroo was causing sedimentation of the main stream behind their own To Lindu 
village of Langko. The issue was not settled at this meeting. In fact, tensions have 
recently been heightened by the mapping project carried out at the very end of 2000 by 
indigenous Lindu adat representatives, some of them trained in participatory 
community mapping techniques by YTM, ostensibly as a prelude to enforcing the two- 
hectare limit on individual land allotment.
A similar divergence of opinion regarding control of land has also strained relations 
between settlers and To Lindu in Kanawu on the eastern side of the lake. These 
differences have recently found more vehement expression due to the implications of 
the proposal, announced by the new governor at the end of 1999, to build a 
hydroelectric project on the Gumbasa River at the outlet of Lake Lindu, a reincarnation 
of the earlier hydroelectric dam proposal whose rejection was traced above. In 
defending this new version of the project, the governor promises that a smaller 
dam/power plant complex will not cause the lake's water level to rise. Hence, the 
population residing in the Lindu plain will not have to be resettled. This plan is 
supported by almost all newcomers in Kanawu, a hamlet now dominated by Muslim 
Bugis migrants, many of whom have amassed small fortunes (by local standards) as 
intermediate marketers of fish, rice, coffee, and cacao. These settlers readily envisage 
the possibilities for more intensive marketing of products from the plain via the 
asphalt supply road for vehicles that would be built to service the dam. Members of 
the To Lindu community remain divided about this project. Many from the more
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"progressive" village of Langko88 support the new project, for they believe the supply 
road would enable them to market goods independently of Bugis middlemen, and they 
see that the road would provide greater access to medical facilities for the seriously ill; 
in contrast, members of a more conservative faction from the village of Anca, one of 
the seven To Lindu origin villages, are more wary, rejecting implementation until a 
thorough environmental impact assessment is made demonstrating the veracity of 
government claims that the dam will not cause the lake to rise.
This divergence of opinion between those To Lindu opposing the dam (and hence 
the motor vehicle road to be built for its construction and maintenance) and migrants 
supporting it has catalyzed considerable resentment on the part of the migrants in 
Kanawu. They perceive their To Lindu opponents as obstreperous enemies of 
development, a cause which they themselves champion, in this context, and this 
perception informs their rejection of To Lindu adat claims to ultimate sovereignty over 
the land that they, as newcomers, have settled. This anger found expression in a 
conversation I witnessed among these migrants while sitting in one of their households 
in the round of visiting immediately following the Hari Raya Idul Fitri mosque service at 
the beginning of 2000:
Abdul89:
For three-hundred-fifty years we were colonized by the Dutch. Then for three- 
and-a-half years we were colonized by the Japanese, but we have to add to that 
another fifty years that we have been colonized by our own nation, by the people 
of the city here.90 They just go down the steps of their house and enter their 
sedan ["while we have to walk to go anywhere" was the implicit contrast]. We 
[here at Lindu] are still in a colonial era, as in former times. When we want to 
voice this, Palu [i.e. the government authorities in Palu] just gives us permission 
for a demonstration [demo]—with banners, [to be conducted] in an orderly 
fashion [but nothing gets done]. The problem is with the NGOs, and our own 
children [anak sendiri, referring to the To Lindu, many of them young men of 
activist orientation, who have worked with such NGOs as YTM and who have 
rejected the new hydroelectric project]. But that's actually "sinning" that they're 
committing, because they're deceiving their own people. They're engaging in the 
struggle to support [memperjuangkan] [this anti-dam, anti-road position] for the 
sake of [filling] their own pockets, not for their own people. These [To Lindu] 
people are even more cruel than the government. It's the [To Lindu] society itself 
that is hindering the road [construction] in their working with the NGOs . . .  They
88 The present-day desa Langko is a village created by the Dutch, when, beginning in 1912, they forced many 
of the To Lindu down into villages immediately surrounding the lake from their former less nucleated 
settlements in the hills further in the lake's periphery. There are no traces left of an earlier pre-colonial 
settlement of the same name, originally located further from the shores of the lake according to To Lindu 
oral history.
89 All names used for inhabitants of Lindu in the text are pseudonyms.
90 People at Lindu, both To Lindu and migrants, often refer to the lack of any motor vehicle road to the 
Lindu plain as evidence that they are still colonized (masih dijajah) by the state. (To reach Lindu from 
outside, travelers must take a seventeen-kilometer walk into the mountains of four hours or more.) I have 
most often heard this idiom used when people are just about to begin the climb from Sadaunta, the hamlet 
located on the road from Palu at which one leaves a van or other motor vehicle to begin the trek up to Lindu.
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[the Lindu people] say that this land is the property [milik] of their ancestors, the 
inheritance from their ancestors [warisan nenek moyang],
Beddu:
Whose ancestors are these? [Ini nenek dari siapal] This [land] is the right of us all; 
the State is the one that owns this property; this is the inheritance of the State, of 
the Indonesian people, all of it. [Ini hak kita semua; Negara punya milik dari tanah 
ini. Ini warisan Negara bangsa Indonesia seluruhnya.] We [the migrants] are the ones 
whose life is good and orderly here, all of the newcomers. Where are their 
demands going to end? We pay our taxes to the regency officials . . . [Because 
there is no motor vehicle road here] even if people are very sick, they have to be 
carried with traditional implements. It often turns out that people die in the 
middle of the path, especially where the path has been disturbed by the 
[transport of] rattan [these are the sections of the trail that have been partially 
eradicated by rattan trailing from the backs of horses and where it is most 
difficult to carry people and goods without falling into the ravine below]. [A 
Lindu youth who has often worked with YTM] is the one who has most often 
choked [our plans]. "This is the inheritance of our ancestors"—that's not an 
unconditional right. It's the government that arranges [mengatur, brings order to] 
us [our lives], so it's the State that has the right to arrange [everything]. This fuss 
about only working 2 ha. [hectares], calling it "customary land" [tanah adat] if 
it's ever been opened [in the past]. It was all forest and jungle here, the State 
owns it. They [the Lindu people] are just jealous, envious because the Bugis here, 
we've only been here a few years, and we're the ones who already have tractors 
and other things . . .  They [the Lindu people] just don't want to progress [maju\. 
There's no sense of balance [keseimbangan] here [i.e. there's no sense that it's the 
deserving who get the good things]; [they make their customary demands] just 
because they're in the majority. The country keeps progressing, and here we're 
just remaining traditional [Negara makin maju; kita masih tradisional] . .  . Now 
we're "autonomous"; we can't oppose i t . . .
In this interchange the Muslim migrants in Kanawu seethe with resentment over the 
active opposition to the construction of the dam and its supply road by some of the 
To Lindu, especially those who have worked closest with NGOs in Palu, and over the 
To Lindu plain-wide adat council's attempt to reassert control over the land the 
migrants view as their own. In response to the council's announced intention to limit 
individuals' land to two hectares, these settlers voice their espousal of the Indonesian 
state's prior definition of all land not under permanent cultivation as state land (tanah 
Negara), land available to be opened for development, a purpose overriding any local 
customary considerations. In so doing, they echo at the local level the subordination of 
customary rights to national interests asserted in the 1960 Agrarian Legislation. As is 
the case with settlers elsewhere, they celebrate themselves as the bearers of progress to 
the Lindu plain,91 bringing to realization the developmentalist ethos that provided the
91 Acciaioli, "Searching for Good Fortune," presents a more detailed argument concerning how the Bugis in 
the 1980s used their view of themselves as bringers of progress, in such forms as the introduction of miracle 
rice varieties and all the associated inputs of the Green Revolution (e.g. pesticides, herbicides, commercial 
fertilizers, tractors, etc.) as part of their "hegemonic strategy" to attempt gaining control of not only the 
local economy, but also local political structures (hamlet and village headship) and cultural institutions 
(sacrifices to the local culture hero).
102 Greg Acciaioli
rationale of New Order government policies, especially those that encouraged 
migration throughout the archipelago, as if it were a level playing field in which mobile 
entrepreneurs would lead backward local populations in the economic struggle for 
progress. They see themselves as, and in many ways they were, the ideal citizens of 
that social, political, and economic regime. For such migrants, as for resettlers and 
transmigrants who have chosen (or sometimes been forced) to leave their homelands, 
the implementation of autonomy legislation at the village level through the 
reinstitutionalization of local customary stipulations and structures is simply a new 
and (in their eyes) unwarranted constraint upon their further development of their new 
settlements and lands—a new form of colonialism. They regard such a revival as an 
unwarranted redefinition of the terms of their settlement and as an unjust 
subordination to regulations and institutions that privilege one undeserving group— 
backward indigenes—creating an unbalanced local context that can only result in 
stagnation and conflict.
Reasserting Harmony: Nationalist Idioms in the Quest to Maintain Peace
Yet, so far violence has not erupted at Lindu. In 1999 there was widespread 
sentiment among the To Lindu to "throw out" (membuang) all the Bugis settlers in the 
wake of an incident in which one Bugis coffee mill operator had a Lindu youth who 
worked for him publicly beaten for stealing a sack of coffee.92 However, the case was 
eventually resolved after the migrant mill operator and his relatives formally asked 
forgiveness at a meeting of the Lindu-wide adat council. Since that time, there has been 
muted talk among some To Lindu of resorting to violence, if necessary, to reclaim land 
the settlers now regard as their own, while the latter stand ready to defend that land 
in similar terms, but it has remained talk within each camp. Despite all such talk, there 
been little resort to public action based upon the apparently irreconcilable interests of, 
on the one hand, the To Lindu, who claim ancestral precedence in settlement and long­
term communal custodianship of land as a warrant for the reimposition of their 
customary regulation of local land, and, on the other hand, newcomers who argue for 
the preservation of their unfettered rights to open and continue working what they 
regard as state land. The peoples inhabiting the Lindu plain are well aware of the 
violence raging between indigenes and settlers, Christians and Muslims, in many other 
parts of Indonesia. References to such hot spots as Ambon in Maluku and Poso in 
Central Sulawesi—the latter felt to be all too near to Lindu itself—are quite commonly 
worked into everyday conversations, formal speeches, and sermons in both Salvation 
Army churches, where the To Lindu worship, and mosques, where the Bugis and 
Muslim Kulawi migrants pray.93 Yet, although the local situation at Lindu parallels 
many aspects of the villages surrounding Poso—in both one finds long-settled 
Christians and relatively recent Muslim migrants competing over land and other
2^ The culprit readily admitted to the misdeed, but the elders of the Lindu plain's adat council felt that the 
punishment was not commensurate with the offence, especially because the punishment was administered 
publicly, which constituted a loss of self-respect (harga dirt) that extended to the whole To Lindu 
community.
93 The majority of settlers from within Kulawi district, both spontaneous and locally transmigrated, are 
Christian of various dominations (unlike the To Lindu, almost 100 percent of whom are Salvation Army 
adherents), but there are quite a few Muslims among these Kulawi settlers as well.
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resources—the communities at Lindu have not followed Poso's example into open 
conflict.
The peoples of Lindu are terrified of experiencing the death and destruction 
continuing in Poso, but terror does not fully explain their actions. A full analysis of the 
situation must consider the active agency of the Lindu inhabitants, both To Lindu and 
settlers, in working to preserve the peace. One of the ways in which local leaders in 
Poso, Maluku, and West Kalimantan have attempted to reestablish peace has been 
through the holding of adat rituals of reconciliation.94 In fact, former President 
Abdurrahman Wahid flew to Poso to attend one such ritual at the end of August, 
2000. In all such cases, the respite from violence has only been transitory. The reasons 
for such failures are already evident in the disparity of viewpoints over land disposal 
canvassed in the previous section. Resort to an adat ceremony for reconciliation 
presupposes the recognition of one contending group's adat as a framework for 
arbitration that transcends the interests of all parties. While "indigenous" communities 
espousing the revival of adat as a source of local sovereignty may well accord such 
recognition, settlers do not acknowledge the adat of a group with which they are in 
conflict as a transcendent source of authority and adjudication. Although the Adat 
Council of the Entire Lindu Plain has felt itself re-empowered to deal with issues of 
land allocation and dispute resolution since legislators of the Reformasi Era have 
invoked and approved "regional autonomy," the peoples of the Lindu plain turned to 
another type of forum to avert violence.95
Interestingly, this meeting was initiated by a political party worker, the principal of 
the elementary school in Anca who serves as the informal Golkar coordinator in the 
Lindu plain.96 As a child he had fled with his family from their Rampi homeland in the 
mountains north of Luwu' when guerrillas of the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion, locally 
known as the gerombolan (the band of terrorists), were moving through the area in the 
1950s, forcing all villagers to convert to Islam on pain of death. Fearing that the current 
spate of violence in Poso and elsewhere could reproduce the earlier conditions of this 
state of civil war in South Sulawesi, especially as refugees fleeing the current violence 
spread to regions like Lindu, where they could stir up local sentiments, he first went to 
the village headman to see what could be done. When this official leader did nothing, 
the principal took it upon himself to go directly to the community of Bugis residing on 
the shore of the lake to make contact with leaders of the Islamic community there. The 
shore community representatives agreed with him, declaring, "We're all beginning to be 
suspicious of each other"; so, they decided to hold a joint meeting. On June 12, 2000, 
representatives of the To Lindu (Christian) community, the Muslim community 
(including the imam of the mosque of Tornado), Salvation Army officers, the head of 
the Adat Council of the Entire Lindu Plain, and the local representatives of 
AMASUTA and the youth association, with the headmen of the four administrative 
villages in the Lindu plain serving as witnesses, all met in the "Forum of Concern for
94 Sudarsono et al., "Ketika Kerusuhan Mengguncang Bumi Khatulistiwa," p. 12.
95 The background information I provide in the following paragraphs regarding the circumstances that led 
to the joint declaration was obtained in an interview with the convenor of the forum whose initial actions I 
describe.
96 In fact, he is still often to be seen wearing his official yellow party jacket when performing such tasks as 
sweeping the central village street in front of his house before school starts in the morning.
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the Harmony of the Religious Communities at Lindu" to produce a set of resolutions, 
observance of which they hoped would preserve the peace at Lindu.97 Indeed, so far it 
has.
The success of this forum, at least in the short run, may be attributed to a number 
of factors. Its initiator, although clearly identified as part of the Christian To Lindu 
community, is himself of settler origins, his family having arrived as refugees from the 
state of civil war in the northern mountains of South Sulawesi in the middle of last 
century. Now an active member of the Salvation Army Church and married to a To 
Lindu wife, he resides uxorilocally (as is the norm for To Lindu postmarital residence) 
in the To Lindu portion of the village. Once his resort to a formal government 
representative had brought no results, he did not turn to the To Lindu adat councils of 
his village or of the entire plain to produce an authoritative statement on the terms of 
peace, but worked together directly with representatives of the Muslim Bugis 
community to establish a more widely representative forum in which a shared 
commitment to keeping the peace could be expressed. Although the authority of the To 
Lindu adat council was acknowledged through having the head of the council for the 
entire plain as a signatory to the statement of resolutions, participation by adat council 
members was not privileged. Indeed, the list of signatories evidences a conscious 
attempt to maintain a balance among secular functionaries (e.g. school teachers), 
Christian and Muslim representatives, and government officials. By the convenor's 
own account, the person upon whom they most relied for framing the final document 
was a junior high school teacher who is himself a migrant of Manadonese descent.
In many ways, such a strategy of inclusiveness evinces the more "secular" 
nationalist goals of Indonesian governments of both the Old and New Order. As one 
might expect from a Golkar functionary, the convenor attempted to have the 
signatories represent various "functional groups" operating in the plain, even including 
an NGO representative. In addition, the very language of the document resounds with 
nationalist idioms characteristic of Indonesian government pronouncements and 
official documents. The forum members seek to strengthen the "unity and integrity" 
(persatuan dan kesatuan) of community life at Lindu, to promote "harmony" 
(kerukunan), to "love peace and live with harmony among the religious communities" 
(cinta damai dan hidup rukun antar sesama umat beragama), and to work toward 
"realizing a just and prosperous society" (mewujudkan masyarakat Adil dan Makmur). 
All these idioms are reminiscent of precisely the sort of governmental rhetoric which 
the customary society movement has critiqued for subordinating local needs to state 
priorities that all too often have only advanced the interests of central elites. Yet, in a 
context of warring local interests, these idioms still have the power of conjuring up the 
nostalgia for nationalist ideals that may never have been realized, yet can apparently 
still command allegiance across ethnic and religious lines.
The influence of the revival of local adat as a frame for adjudicating local disputes 
is still evident in the central place accorded the document's chief goal and value, 
phrased in the Tado language of the To Lindu. The aim of the forum is summarized as 
the endeavor to hold in high regard and defend the value of "our living together"
97 A translation of the full text of the statement issuing from this forum is provided as an appendix.
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(masintuwuta [T])98 as the essence of Lindu adat. However, as defined in the next-to- 
last resolution of the document, this core notion seems to derive as much from 
Indonesian state values as from a local adat orientation:
1. A family feeling that consists of fellow community members loving, 
respecting, and valuing one another.
2. Creating a feeling of loving tranquillity.
3. Creating a situation and condition of tolerance that is secure and full of 
friendly feeling.
4. Not easily provoked by emotions and not provoking the emotions of others.
5. All the inhabitants who have settled permanently in Lindu must truly feel 
they are friends to one another and are all a part of the Lindu populace.
6. Reporting as quickly as possible to the village governmental apparatus or 
those who have authority if there are matters or reports that bring unrest to the 
community.
Just as a "feeling of loving tranquillity" reiterates national values stressing the stable, 
peaceful conditions conducive for development, so such duties as reporting unrest to 
the village administrative apparatus seem to have more to do with inhabitants' 
responsibilities as good citizens obeying government functionaries than with customary 
commitments. Not surprisingly, a list of steps that those government functionaries 
should take to insure peace concludes the resolutions. Even the rhetorical expression of 
the ethos of To Lindu adat as a summation of the forum's purpose is ultimately 
subjected to the nationalist framework of governmental ideals and modes of 
administration; the realization of the goals implicit in that ethos is rendered dependent 
on a set of values and procedures derived from that nationalist framework.
Conclusion: Transcending Customary Law to Deal with Difference
While unique in certain respects, the Lindu case also evinces many characteristics 
found in other parts of the archipelago currently experiencing communal violence. As 
elsewhere, "indigenous" advocates of revived adat jurisdiction stand opposed to 
newcomers, including both spontaneous migrants and resettlers from within the local 
region, who prefer to abide by state frameworks of land disposal and development 
goals. The conflict of interests over control of land and other resources is analogous to 
conflicts that have pitted indigenes against settlers in such regions as Maluku, North 
Maluku, West and Central Kalimantan, and nearby Poso as well. In many of these 
regions it has been especially the Bugis, given their entrepreneurial skills and powers of 
political organization (not to mention their aggressive self-presentation, sometimes 
typified by their carrying of daggers [badik]), who have most attracted the ire of the 
indigenous populace. To Lindu resentment has similarly been largely focused on the 
Bugis newcomers from South Sulawesi.99 Yet, so far, violence has been averted at
98 Linguistically, the Tado term masintuwuta can be analyzed as a combination of the active verb prefix ma- 
plus the prefix sin-, indicating reciprocal or shared action, the root tuwu ("to live"), and the suffix -ta for 
first person plural (inclusive).
99 Significantly, all those chosen as prominent Islamic figures (tokoh) to sign the resolutions of the "forum of 
concern for the harmony of the religious communities at Lindu" were members of the Bugis community, 
rather than any of the local Kulawi Muslims.
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Lindu, despite recent To Lindu threats to expel the Bugis and continuing Bugis anger 
(not to mention self-righteousness) over the impediments to the development of their 
enterprises posed by the claims of To Lindu adat and its advocates. The larger context 
of regional autonomy in which the customary society movement has begun to assert 
itself more stridently has facilitated a greater assertiveness by the To Lindu adat 
councils, extending even to sponsoring participatory mapping—the participants being, 
of course, To Lindu men and their NGO allies—as a prelude to enforcement of their 
declaration of limitations on land use. But Bugis fisherfolk, wet-rice farmers, and 
intermediate marketers have continued to counter such efforts, lobbying with the 
subdistrict head more vigorously than ever to gain recognition of Kanawu, the primary 
Bugis settlement on the eastern shore of Lake Lindu, as a desa on its own, which would 
then no longer have to be subordinate to the adat council of desa Tornado controlled by 
the To Lindu. The struggle between settlers resorting to official government channels to 
gain recognition of their claims and indigenes asserting the sovereignty of their 
customary institutions thus continues in heightened form in the changed circumstances 
created by regional autonomy.
Tania Murray Li has recently raised concerns about the "politics of difference in 
general, and the racialization of territory in particular"100 that appear to be 
consequences of the demands of AMAN for recognition of the rights of communities of 
"indigenous peoples" to govern themselves and control their local resources. This quest 
for local sovereignty may all too easily degenerate into "a differentiated legal system in 
which recognition of customary law would subject people to local despotisms and the 
whims of 'traditional' leaders who could monopolize or sell collective resources, or 
pass unreasonable judgments, substituting one tyranny for another."101 Such fears, 
admittedly mitigated by Li in her further exploration of the background of the 
masyarakat adat movement, evoke the concerns articulated by Mamdani in his recent 
study of the colonial and postcolonial politics of custom in the regions of Africa once 
dominated by Britain and France.102 In that context, Mamdani disparaged the power 
wielded by "tribal chiefs" designated by the colonial governments, authoritarian 
figures who combined in their person legislative, executive, and judicial power in the 
name of traditional custom and in the context of sometimes invented cultural units 
labeled "tribes." Crucial to the exercise of their power was the declaration of all land 
in tribal areas as customary and communal103 and thus subject to the exclusive control 
of these local leaders, who often represented the interests of only one ethnic group in 
areas with long histories of migration and conquest.104 This "indirect despotism" 
fostered a tribalism that has continued as one of the major impediments to 
democratization in contemporary Africa.
The contemporary customary society movement in Indonesia has worked to raise 
adat councils to positions of authority, each controlling the resources of its own
100 Li, "Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's Forest Zone," p. 646.
101 Ibid.
102 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). I am grateful to Thomas Gibson for pointing out the relevance 
of this African study for the contemporary political situation in Indonesia.
103 Ibid., pp. 51,139.
104 Ibid., p. 79.
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ancestral territory. The authority usually sought by such adat councils combines 
functions of issuing regulations, administering and enforcing them, and issuing 
judgments and sanctions upon their transgression in a national context of multiple 
local sovereignties. If the customary society movement gains widespread influence in 
the nation, such a development might indeed pose worries for those of classic left­
leaning persuasion who are more sympathetic in the Indonesian context to the class 
struggles of the "people" (i.e. rakyat) in the quest for national democratization105; their 
concerns for Indonesia would echo Mamdani's concerns for Africa. The constellation of 
forces that have articulated this juncture in Indonesia—governmental transition, 
international concern for environmental resources channeled through NGOs, human 
rights agendas of international donor agencies, etc.106—certainly differ, at least in part, 
from the imperatives of extraction in the European colonial regimes. The apparent 
bottom-up character of demands in the Indonesian customary society movement, 
however much facilitated by outside agencies acting in top-down manner, also 
distinguishes the contemporary Indonesian context from, for instance, the African 
context or the earlier situation in the Dutch East Indies. But the way in which 
conservative frameworks of qdat, adopted and adapted from Dutch colonial models 
that assumed the existence of bounded units with unitary custom reminiscent of 
African "tribes,"107 have been chosen to channel these aspirations does render 
problematic the situation of all those who are not easily encompassed within such 
boundaries, such as the millions of spontaneous migrants and govemmentally 
sponsored transmigrants and resettlers who have, over the decades, moved from their 
homelands (not to mention Indonesia's burgeoning population of IDPs (internally 
displaced persons) in the wake of conflicts in East Timor [now Timor Loro Sa'e], 
Maluku, Poso . . . ) .
Peter Bums has noted the contradictions in the very notion of "customary law" 
(adatrecht), as formulated by the Dutch colonial jurists of the Leiden School,108 to 
which contemporary Indonesian advocates of masyarakat adat are now turning. 
Following from Diamond's distinction of the "rule of law" versus the "order of 
custom "109 and Josselin de Jong's reference to "customary law" as a "confusing 
fiction,"110 Bums argues that local custom cannot function as a sovereign authority to 
adjudicate disputes among parties of different origin111; in short, it cannot attain the 
transcendent impartiality necessary for a framework of law to be used throughout the 
nation. It is thus not surprising that the forum used by the peoples of Lindu to 
maintain a situation of peace in their locale resounded with nationalist idioms of 
harmony and appeal to formal governmental powers of enforcement by village 
headmen. Although invoking a To Lindu concept of living together (masintuwuta [T]) 
and threatening tire imposition of "customary sanctions of the highest severity" for
105 Li, "Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's Forest Zone," pp. 648- 
664.
106 Ibid., pp.650ff.
107 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 79.
108 Peter Burns, "The Myth of Adat," journal of Legal Pluralism 28 (1989): 1-127.
109 Stanley Diamond, "The rule of law versus the order of custom," Social Research 38,1 (1971): 42-72.
110 J. P. B. Josselin de Jong, Customary Law (A Confusing Fiction) (Amsterdam: Het Indisch Instituut, 1948).
111 Bums, "The Myth of Adat," p. 4.
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transgressions of this ethos, the forum's exposition of this core value is given in terms 
that derive in large part from nationalist values. What is more, the observance of the 
forum's resolutions is to "be monitored and evaluated by the Government" as well as 
by all the people inhabiting the Lindu plain, not just by the To Lindu adat councils.
The customary society movement has certainly provided an alternative model of 
authority that may address the injustices of resource extraction and community 
disempowerment that characterized New Order models of development and progress. 
However, it has also contributed to increased communal tensions by failing to 
recognize the heterogeneity of local settlements and promulgating the monoethnic cast 
of the revival of local adat: for each territory a single people's custom is to be sovereign. 
The Lindu experience hints that the disputes between indigenes and migrants that have 
erupted into violence in so many parts of the archipelago may be more responsive to a 
differently legitimized framework of adjudication. Many settlers remain committed to 
visions of the level playing field that infused New Order rhetoric, as such notions 
facilitated their mobility and justified their modes of exploiting natural resources. It is 
no accident that the figure who initiated the "Forum of Concern for the Harmony of the 
Religious Communities at Lindu" was not only somewhat interstitial—both a settler 
(although from a Christian region) and a member of the To Lindu community (through 
marriage)—but also a Golkar functionary. Avoiding or quelling violence may require the 
continued invocation of nationalist idioms and modes of participation that recognize 
the settler presence in ways that the discourses and practices of adat sovereignty, 
structured as they are by atavistic visions of homogeneous community,112 inherently 
fail to accommodate.
112 One of the current research projects at the Southeast Asia Research Center of the City University of 
Hong Kong is investigating atavistic strategies (e.g. the re-establishment of an autonomous sultanate in 
Aceh) being used by various groups seeking independence or autonomy in contexts of the re-emergence of 
political fault-lines throughout the Southeast Asian region.
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APPENDIX:
Forum of Concern for the Harmony of the Religious Communities at Lindu
1. Background
With a view to the situation and condition that have changed so quickly at the 
Lindu plain as a result of the influence of the disturbances that have occurred at this 
time, along with the proliferation of misleading information, we are thus taking the 
initiative to build a bridge to promote real harmony between the religious communities, 
so that fellows may have no suspicion toward each other and live as friends, as well 
as strengthening our Union and Unity.
2. The Problem
A portion of the inhabitants feels apprehensive, disturbed about issues and 
misleading reports whose sources are not clear as a result of the influence of 
disturbances in other areas that have spread to Lindu.
3. Aims
In order to prevent forms of apprehension, suspicion, and fear, as well as 
disintegration, among fellow inhabitants of the Lindu plain, Anarchists should be 
prohibited [from provoking violent activities] as early as possible so that a situation 
and condition conducive [to harmony] can be sustained and upgraded.
4. Subject Matter o f the Meeting [names of speakers suppressed]
A. An explanation from the Initiators concerning the formation of the Forum of 
Concern for the Harmony of the Religious Communities at Lindu was given by the head 
of the forum. The essence of this discussion was that the aim of the Forum was only to 
provide a bridge that would render the ties of fraternity closer and more harmonious, 
promoting the general concord of religious communities at Lindu, and that the Forum 
did not have any Political content.
B. A formal response was given by the Anca village headman, as representative of the 
four villages [of Lindu], emphasizing how the Government received the efforts of the 
initiators positively and appealing to the entire community that they not be easily 
provoked and would report any provocateur [to the government authorities].
C. A formal response from the Lindu Sectional [Salvation Army] Officer, representing 
the leaders of the Christian Religion, concerned how the Christian community should
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not be easily provoked [literally, "hooked"] by the issues that were disturbing the 
peace-loving and harmonious life among fellow religious communities.
D. A formal response from the Islamic figures was given by the imam of the Kanawu 
mosque, emphasizing the necessity of resoluteness on the part of the government in 
guarding and preserving the harmonious concord [of the religious communities] if there 
were violations that departed from legal and religious norms.
E. A treatment in further depth of the subject matter of religious groups living in 
harmony was given by [a teacher from the Lindu plain's junior high school in Tornado]. 
Religious communities living in harmony constructed Union and Unity and constituted 
an asset and national capital in realizing a Just and Prosperous Society.
The Clear Resolve of the Community of the Lindu Plain, Kulawi Subdistrict
On this day, Monday the 12th of June 2000, in a building of State Junior High 
School No. 3 of Kulawi in the village of Tornado in the Lindu plain, we, the community 
of the Lindu plain, which consists of four administrative villages—that is, Puroo, 
Langko, Tornado, Anca—with the respective village headmen, leaders of the Christian 
religion, leaders of the Islamic religion, [members of] the customary councils, prominent 
figures of the community, and other figures from the youth and community generally all 
attending, conducted a meeting to come to a consensual agreement with the aim of 
anticipating the entry of irresponsible shady characters (provocateurs) who 
purposefully aim to destroy the harmonious order of the community as a whole and 
the harmonious life of our religious communities [in particular].
After having accommodated everyone's aspirations, the participants of this 
meeting, have, with accurate and trustworthy judgment, along with the team of 
initiators, formed, agreed upon and put into practice in our everyday life with all 
seriousness and sincerity a commitment to the clear resolve of the Lindu plain 
community to act as follows:
I. We continue to value each other's differences of ethnicity, race, and religion, as 
well as defending the harmony of living as religious communities.
II. We continue to love the integrity of our nation's union and unity.
ID. We reject all forms of crime, disturbance, fighting, and splintering of harmony 
within and among the religious communities.
IV. We hate and reject aU instigators or those who pass on information whose aim is 
directed to promoting disputes or disorder, both those who emerge from within the 
Lindu plain or those who come from outside.
V. We will not engage in throwing [of projectiles], destruction, burning of houses of 
worship, inhabitants' houses, or other public facilities.
VI. All inhabitants of the Lindu Plain will unite in the aim of expelling instigators or 
provocateurs who enter our beloved Lindu plain.
VII. We hold in high esteem and defend the essence of the "Custom of Our Living 
Together" [MASINTUWUTA, capitalized in the original document, from Tado, the 
indigenous language of the Lindu people], which has the following meaning:
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1. A family feeling that consists of fellow community members loving, 
respecting, and valuing one another.
2. Creating a feeling of loving tranquillity.
3. Creating a situation and condition of tolerance that are secure and full of 
friendly feeling.
4. Not easily provoked by emotions and not provoking the emotions of others.
5. All the inhabitants who have settled permanently in Lindu must truly feel 
they are friends to one another and are all a part of the Lindu populace.
6. Reporting as quickly as possible to the village governmental apparatus or 
those who have authority if there are matters or reports that bring unrest to the 
community.
VUI. Pressure the village administration of the Lindu plain to take resolute, 
authoritative measures, including:
1. Prohibit people selling alcoholic beverages to the general public and causing 
the drunkenness that only triggers commotion, fights, etc.
2. Activate the village patrol and fit out the guard posts and the announcement 
board.
3. Make it compulsory for all inhabitants who receive visitors to report with 
their visitors as quickly as possible to the Village Administration. (A Team for 
Receiving Guests is specifically to be established for the Kanawu region, whose 
stipulations are to be determined by the Tornado village headman.)
4. Establish a Customary Council for the Kanawu region as quickly as possible.
5. Prohibit the operators of motorized passenger boats [i.e. lake taxis] operating 
at night except with the permission of the authorities.
6. Give general guidelines to the society directly or through such intermediaries 
as religious leaders, customary leaders, and their associated agencies on such 
matters as:
A. Parents in each family have to bring up their sons and daughters well.
B. Youths have to restrain themselves, resist being easily provoked, and 
challenge themselves to become genuine peacemakers.
C. The administration of the village concerned should prevent the 
concentrations of groups of people, adolescents, and young people at 
unofficial activities.
IX. Every violator of this [statement of] Commitment to the Resolution Agreed Upon 
will be subjected to customary sanctions of the highest severity.
X. As participants in this discussion, we feel obligated to be examples and models in 
carrying out the contents of this single-minded and pure resolution of the community of 
the Lindu Plain.
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We thus make this clear resolve of the community of the Lindu Plain with a full 
sense of responsibility for our common interests:
Forum of Concern for the Harmony of Religious Communities
[names suppressed in following list of signatories]
1. Head: Principal of the Anca Primary School
2. Secretary: Teacher in Junior High School No. 3, Kulawi Subdistrict
3. Member: Teacher in Junior High School No. 3, Kulawi Subdistrict
4. Member: Islamic community figure
5. Member: [Salvation Army] Officer [Major] of the Lindu Section
6. Member: Head of the Local Branch of the Indonesian Teachers' Union
7. Member: Islamic community figure
8. Member: Head of the Lindu Customary Council for the Entire Lindu Plain 
[Lembaga Hadat seDataran Lindu]
9. Member: Islamic community figure [actually imam of Tornado mosque]
10. Member: NGO Representative at Lindu [local Lindu representative for the 
Alliance of Central Sulawesi Customary Societies, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Sulawesi 
Tengah, or AMASUTA]
11. Member: Youth group figure
ACKNOWLEDGED BY
Anca Village Headman Tornado Village Headman
Langko Village Headman Puroo Village Headman
5. Conclusion.
After this commitment to the agreement on the clear resolve of the Lindu plain 
community has been initiated, in order that it be applied in our everyday life, it will be 
monitored and evaluated by the [local] Government connected to it and by all strata of 
the community of the Lindu plain. This commitment to the agreement concerning the 
clear resolve of the Lindu plain community will be socialized [inculcated to the 
members of the community] through reproductions or photocopies that can be read in 
houses, houses of worship, places of public meeting or put up in places where it is 
easily seen by people. The funds [for this effort] come from the voluntary contributions 
of the initiators and participants in the discussions.
Therefore, we who have acted in the name of the Forum of Concern for the 
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Map 1
Sulawesi: The Four Provinces
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Map 2
Settlements and Wet-Rice Fields Surrounding Lake Lindu
